

CIA Headquarters

National Security Exposure Assessment


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September 2, 2026



Executive Assessment

CIA Headquarters at Langley is the Agency's main campus. Thousands of officers, analysts, and visitors use the same public roads as everyone else in Northern Virginia. A late-night pile-up of cars linked to analysts, operations support, and leadership could be a sign that a mission center had gone into crisis mode.

This study asks a simple question: if someone drove from a nearby home to a gate and back, would they pass a Flock camera? The numbers are a model of possible drives, not a count of real people.

At 20 miles, about 62.1% of those modeled trips pass a camera. Another 21.2% might pass one, and 15.9% could not be determined. Closer in, at 5 miles, only 4.3% have a confirmed camera on every road — a large share stay in “might pass” because the camera's facing could not be confirmed. This is a model of routes, not proof that anyone was watched.

HEADLINE RESULT · MODELED TRIPS TO A GATE

20 MILES OUT

■ **62.1%****Passes a camera**

A confirmed camera sits on every plausible road to a gate.

■ **21.2%****Might pass**

The inventory's rotationAngle is not a true facing: among 72,971 named in-service cameras it matches the road only about 10% of the time (median error 90°) because it stores housing orientation, not travel. The model therefore does not use it to confirm a hit. Named NB/SB/EB/WB cameras take direction from the road, with the name used only to pick which way they watch. Cameras with no compass name are too noisy to confirm, so a nearby pass stays Might pass. A confirmed hit still needs the vehicle on the same corridor, traveling in that monitored direction within 35°.

■ **0.7%****Avoids all cameras**

No confirmed camera on any plausible road.

■ **15.9%****Couldn't determine**

Extra driveway or side-road options could not be fully routed, so those trips stay unresolved instead of being guessed.

5 MILES OUT

■ **4.3%** Passes ■ **80.8%** Might pass ■ **1.3%** Avoids ■ **13.6%** Couldn't determine

Might pass is 80.8% here because rotationAngle is not a reliable facing, so unnamed or poorly oriented cameras stay in this bucket instead of counting as a hit. **Couldn't determine is 13.6% here because** extra driveway or side-road options could not be fully routed, so those trips stay unresolved instead of being guessed.

Installation Context

CIA publicly identifies the Langley campus as its principal headquarters and states that it has been home to thousands of personnel [E54]. The agency's public mission includes foreign-intelligence collection, all-source analysis, mission-center work, and technical and digital capabilities [E55]. Those broad descriptions establish why aggregate workforce and visitor patterns may matter without revealing a particular office, officer, source, operation, or classified activity.

The intelligence value of movement at Langley lies in correlated change. A single vehicle cannot establish agency affiliation or assignment. Repeated patterns may distinguish ordinary support traffic from after-hours mission-center activity, recurring foreign or interagency liaison visits, technical contractor relationships, and deployment-related absence among a smaller group.

The study did not identify a CIA employee, officer, mission center, contractor, foreign liaison, household, or operation. It uses two reviewed access points and synthetic occupied-housing origins; neither the gate model nor public mission sources establish the real commuting behavior of any agency component.

Installation-Specific Intelligence Scenarios

The study demonstrates Tier A deployment and modeled route exposure only. Both scenarios below require Tier B historical time-stamped observations and Tier C identity or organizational enrichment that were not obtained.

Scenario 1: Detecting a Mission-Center Activation During an Overseas Crisis

Assume that a foreign intelligence service obtains historical vehicle observations around the Langley campus and establishes a baseline for ordinary workforce and visitor activity. The service may not know which vehicles belong to analysts, operations-support personnel, technical specialists, security staff, or leaders. It can nevertheless identify clusters that recur during public international crises or unusual after-hours periods.

Suppose a stable set of vehicles associated with several normally distinct communities begins arriving at night and remains active through a weekend. Additional security, contractor, or liaison vehicles appear during the same interval. A prolonged, multi-cluster deviation could suggest that a mission center or headquarters coordination element is responding to an overseas crisis, threat to U.S. personnel, intelligence emergency, or time-sensitive policy requirement [E54, E55].

The adversary might not learn the collection source, target, planned response, or analytic judgment. It could still infer that the issue has reached headquarters significance, estimate when the response began, and identify which external agencies or partner communities appear involved. That warning could lead a hostile service to change communications, move personnel, destroy evidence, or intensify deception.

Longitudinal records may also reveal which personnel are absent after the surge, which vehicles return together, and which support communities remain active. Those changes can help distinguish a short analytic review from a larger operation involving travel or deployment.

The 2026 AP reporting on Iran's camera network provides a direct precedent for using compromised civilian surveillance to map sensitive leadership and security activity. The reporting described exploitation of street and traffic cameras to identify routes, protective personnel, locations, and meetings among senior officials [E141]. It does not establish any similar access at Langley. It demonstrates that state services regard routine movement and rare convergence as operational intelligence.

The present study does not show a CIA mission-center activation or identify an agency employee. The scenario requires historical observations, organizational or identity enrichment, and a defensible baseline that accounts for shift work, security operations, visitors, construction, and the campus's many unrelated support functions.

Scenario 2: Mapping Foreign-Liaison, Interagency, and Contractor Relationships at Langley

CIA's public mission necessarily involves interaction with other U.S. agencies, technical partners, and foreign counterparts, but public sources do not identify the participants in a particular engagement [E55]. A hostile service could attempt to reconstruct those relationships through recurring vehicle co-occurrence.

Unfamiliar rental vehicles, diplomatic transportation, government fleets, or contractor vehicles may appear repeatedly beside a stable set of Langley-associated vehicles. Observations at airports, hotels, embassies, contractor offices, or other federal facilities could help infer the delegation's size, duration, probable country or organization, and the CIA personnel who repeatedly meet it.

The subject of the relationship could remain unknown. Yet identifying that a particular foreign service, technical vendor, military organization, or interagency unit is meeting a particular Langley cluster can reveal priorities, partnerships, capability development, or response to an unfolding event. It also creates a small target list for cyber or human-intelligence collection.

Over time, the vehicles that bridge several delegations may identify liaison officers, senior technical personnel, or contractors with unusually broad access. Historical observations can then expose their homes, family vehicles, and off-site routines.

Royal Concierge is a direct precedent for this collection objective. Reporting based on Snowden documents described a GCHQ program that monitored hotel reservations to identify diplomats' travel timing and location and prepare additional surveillance [E147]. The intelligence value lay in the overlap among officials and host locations, not in the hotel transaction itself.

The study did not obtain hotel, airline, visitor, registration, or plate-history data. It cannot identify a liaison relationship or contractor. The scenario shows how ALPR records could serve as the roadway equivalent of a travel-alert system when combined with other commercial and government datasets.

Combined Significance

The first scenario concerns mission tempo: movement changes could signal that headquarters is responding to an overseas crisis. The second concerns relationship mapping: recurring visitors and vehicle overlaps could disclose which foreign, interagency, or technical partners are involved. Together they expose both when a sensitive activity is occurring and who may be participating.

Primary Reachability Findings

Modeled route-coverage estimate, reported for both scopes with its uncertainty ranges.

Field	5-mile near-base	20-mile primary
Result label	V7 modeled estimate	V7 modeled estimate
Publication status	Modeled estimate (5 caveats)	Modeled estimate (5 caveats)
Headline channel	robust_lattice	robust_lattice
Primary H0 U/C/P/R	1.4%/4.5%/91.9%/2.2%	1.2%/70.6%/24.5%/3.7%
Robust H0/H1/H2 U/C/P/R	1.3%/4.3%/80.8%/13.6%	0.7%/62.1%/21.2%/15.9%
H0 validation	single-reviewer check	single-reviewer check

The complete modeled result record for both scopes - all sensitivity intervals, gate/direction/range sweeps, camera-cluster influence, modeling caveats, seeds, and SHA-256 hashes - is in the V7 Modeled Result Record under Evidence and Reproducibility below.

20-mile minus 5-mile weighted unobserved-rate difference: primary conditional H0 **-0.2** percentage points; separate robust H0/H1/H2 lattice **-0.6** percentage points. These channels answer different questions and are not averaged. [L41]

Legislative Significance

CIA Headquarters warrants the strongest available sensitive-location controls. Historical non-hit plate records covering the campus should be subject to strict retention, sharing, auditing, vendor-access, and breach-notification requirements developed with intelligence-community counterintelligence authorities. The controls should limit bulk location and association searches while avoiding public disclosure of exact coverage gaps or access patterns.

Neither recommendation depends on a claim that a current operator acted improperly. The policy issue is whether a longitudinal commercial movement archive surrounding a sensitive national-security site should be retained, broadly shared, or exposed through vendor and subcontractor systems without controls proportionate to the intelligence value of the aggregate record.

Four Reported Vulnerabilities

Finding	Observed condition	Evidence boundary	Disclosure and remediation status	Source(s)
1	An active ArcGIS Default API key was hardcoded in a public development/demo asset and repeated key material was found across development assets.	The validation establishes key scope and private item grants; it does not prove that every granted item was read or altered by another party.	Reported 2025-06-11; remediation reported 2025-07-01.	L2, L5, L8, L20
2	FlockSafety development application and module-federation bundles were served before the correct authentication boundary.	The bundles expose application logic, routes, models, and permission concepts; frontend visibility does not prove anonymous access to every backend or production record.	Reported 2025-11-13 with follow-ups on 2025-11-14 and 2025-11-19; no closure or remediation detail appears in the disclosure record.	L2, L5, L11-L13
3	Planner/Beefeater endpoints issued ArcGIS and Google mapping credentials before login, including a production-scope path used to obtain the analyzed export.	Wire records prove anonymous HTTP 200 token responses and establish provenance; they do not prove every downstream service permitted every operation.	Reported 2025-11-13 with follow-ups on 2025-11-14 and 2025-11-19; no closure or remediation detail appears in the disclosure record.	L2, L14, L15, L37

Finding	Observed condition	Evidence boundary	Disclosure and remediation status	Source(s)
4	FlockNova application bundles were served before the correct access boundary and revealed search, pivot, fusion, and client-side permission assumptions.	The exposed code establishes application structure and data-source concepts; it does not establish that every modeled backend endpoint lacked authorization or that every modeled dataset was populated.	Reported 2025-12-05; no reply or remediation detail appears in the disclosure record.	L2, L4, L35

The findings are distinct but composable. Findings 2 and 4 exposed the vocabulary and architecture of search, alerting, mapping, and fusion workflows. Findings 1 and 3 exposed two different credential failures: a static production-scoped ArcGIS key and a pre-login credential-issuance path. Finding 3 supplied the provenance for the production map-point export used here. The combination supports a conclusion about systemic credential and environment-boundary weakness during the research period, while remaining narrower than a claim of universal platform compromise [L2, L8, L37].

The disclosure record also cannot establish a negative. Responsible reporting and a known remediation date for Finding 1 do not prove that no other person accessed the exposed surfaces, just as the absence of a returned closure notice for Findings 2 through 4 does not prove that they remain exploitable today. The reports preserve the observed condition, collection date, and known response status so that legal and technical reviewers can distinguish evidence from present-tense assumptions.

Methodology

Research and Data Basis

This assessment follows four separate disclosures involving credentials, development assets, environment boundaries, and a data-fusion application. A public development artifact contained an active ArcGIS credential; other development bundles exposed application structure before the expected access boundary; a Planner/Beefeater path issued production-scope mapping credentials before login; and FlockNova bundles exposed the structure of a broader fusion and search environment [L2, L4, L5, L8, L37]. None of those findings alone proves universal backend access. Together, they justified examining what sensitive geospatial information became available and what defensive questions it could support.

The production ArcGIS export captured on December 14, 2025 contains 335,701 records spanning multiple device types and statuses; it is not a count of simultaneously active cameras. The status fields record 214,073 `inService`, 83,427 `inPlanning`, 38,190 decommissioned, and 11 unknown records. The route study loads detection-eligible `inService` and `inPlanning` records and preserves a separate `inService`-only floor. The `active` integer is not the study filter [L14, L15].

Exposed application materials model plate and vehicle search, camera selection, hit history, alerts, people-search paths, map layers, CAD and AVL concepts, Raven/audio sensors, device access, and identity-adjacent fusion permissions [L4, L11-L13, L35]. Flock's patent describes a dynamic surveillance and object-query architecture, but a patent describes claimed architecture rather than proving deployment of each patented capability [E37]. The report therefore separates observed code and export fields from product descriptions and hypothetical intelligence use.

The counterintelligence and force-protection concern arises because personnel, contractors, and visitors associated with CIA Headquarters must use public transportation infrastructure outside the protected facility. The route model does not establish where any real employee or visitor lives or how any individual travels. It evaluates only the public-road exposure of the declared synthetic residential frame.

Longitudinal location information can expose associations and patterns that isolated observations do not. Supreme Court decisions concerning long-term GPS tracking and historical location records provide relevant policy and legal context without deciding the legality of this vendor, dataset, or study [E20, E21]. The constitutional and privacy implications belong in legal and policy review, not in unsupported declarations that every collection or search is unlawful.

My analytical judgment is that commercial growth and procurement convenience must not displace United States national-security, counterintelligence, force-protection, constitutional, and public-accountability obligations. That is a normative conclusion, not evidence that profit caused a particular breach or that a specific customer misused data.

Estimand and Synthetic Origins

The V7 primary estimand is the occupied-housing-weighted distribution across unobserved, confirmed exposure, possible exposure, and unresolved model under one predeclared, camera-blind H0 access-and-route policy. H0 defines the pinned origin, eligible unchanged saved gates, 5/20-road-mile frame, final per-leg scope, and primary conditional result. Every in-frame sampled weight remains in the four-class denominator; proven out-of-frame origins are excluded before sampling, while frame-unknown, unresolved-model, and artifact-error states remain explicit.

Each directed outbound and return leg must be no more than the declared radius. A qualifying round trip can therefore approach 10 miles in the 5-mile scope or 40 miles in the 20-mile scope. This is not a total-round-trip cap of 5 or 20 miles.

H1/H2 remain identity-keyed alternative access policies used only for the separate robustness lattice and fixed-H0-gate access sensitivity. H1/H2 cannot rescue a failed H0, set the primary status, change H0 frame membership, or contribute cameras to the H0 result. The two channels are co-located and never averaged [L41].

Reviewed 24/7 Gates

The paired study used Gate 1 and Gate 2 as the reviewed gate set. Only gates treated during setup as continuously open to authorized traffic are eligible. A part-time, visitor-only, commercial-only, or schedule-limited gate would create a modeled route that disappears outside its operating window, so including it as continuously available would overstate practical access. The gate decision concerns availability, not secrecy; coordinates and identifiers remain in the unredacted annexes.

The same gate set was used at both radii. The saved study state also contained 0 analyst-defined road blocks. Gates and blocks are inputs rather than outputs. A high or low unobserved rate does not validate the gate review, so an installation reviewer should read the exact saved identifiers and artifact warnings when judging whether the modeled access assumptions match local practice.

Cameras, Roads, and Routing

The V7 route and gate policy receives no camera coordinates, encounter results, or camera-derived costs. It uses the frozen routing and inventory assumptions bound into the completed cohort (`valhalla-3.6.3-auto-frozen-osm-camera-blind-directed-overlay-v6`). Outbound and return routes are legal directed requests and are evaluated independently against the declared per-leg scope.

Camera encounters remain geometry, corridor, bearing, lifecycle-status, and capture-model inferences rather than observed plate reads. The H0 point channel retains direction and spatial/grade sensitivity separately. Camera influence is computed by physical camera cluster so colocated compute/support records are not counted as independent roadside sensors. Planned-device and in-service-only status variants remain sensitivity evidence rather than claims of confirmed real-world operation [L41].

Why Five and Twenty Miles

DoD Manual 4165.63 permits housing-market boundaries based on a twenty-mile or one-hour peak-traffic commute, with military and public information and installation-command input supporting local adjustment [E49]. The study predeclared the distance limb as a uniform, transparent approximation of the broader off-installation housing and commuting area. It does not assert that most personnel at CIA Headquarters live exactly twenty miles away, and it does not model one hour of peak traffic.

Five miles isolates the immediate area where travel converges toward a limited gate set. Twenty miles adds the broader housing-market stratum while retaining every near-base draw unchanged. Reporting both shows whether corridor concentration near the facility differs from the surrounding occupied-housing geography without changing the near-base sample.

Limitations and Non-Claims

This is a model over dated deployment, Census, and road snapshots. Occupied housing is a residential-distribution proxy, not an installation workforce roster; it does not weight origins by military assignment, employer, rank, duty status, shift, or measured traffic. National off-base housing evidence supports the scope choice but cannot identify where personnel assigned to CIA Headquarters live [E44-E46].

Camera location and status fields can be incomplete, stale, planned, duplicated, moved, or differently interpreted. OSM roads and address points can omit valid travel or include obsolete topology. Gate availability and cantonment geometry depend on analyst review. The route engine models corridor blocking, accepted alternatives, and a geometric field-of-view capture; it does not model OCR probability, optical obscuration, weather, plate condition, device uptime, data retention, customer sharing, legal process, or whether a backend user queried a record.

A V7 unobserved H0 classification is a conditional modeled-policy result: under the frozen H0 access, gate, routing, inventory-status, and capture rules, the legal directed round trip had no qualifying modeled encounter. It is not a share of people, drivers, commuters, households, actual trips, or empirical camera reads. The separate robust lattice and access, gate-choice, direction, spatial/grade, range, deployment-status, sampling, and camera-cluster sensitivities must remain visible qualifications. Source omissions, device uptime, weather, plate visibility, temporary road conditions, and camera movement can change real-world collection.

Evidence and Reproducibility

The V7 drafting packet was built from the complete validated cohort for `cia_headquarters`. It binds cohort `reachability-v7-audit-92bd2e6a45c3a7c6`, pair `cia_headquarters-c5222d19d425d6c7`, seed `2841592109`, index SHA-256 `3d0755cb6fcc7dd165c6b9dd53ade8bfe5402773231904ea3807d1f17dc3b96b`, five-mile summary SHA-256 `0818cd99514031a58454659c83786a434c90103b3a4a54bebd9fde577fef5d5f`, and twenty-mile summary SHA-256 `1a5f8851150d91b088c6b99a2e39b9359f69c755c26e23163e8f1ee122055d2c`. [L41].

Both scopes retain the primary H0 and robust-lattice partitions, full frame accounting, per-policy outcomes and failures, directed route geometry, modeled camera encounters, split uncertainty intervals, gate-choice sensitivity, physical-camera-cluster influence, frozen source snapshot, and independent QA. All QA flags and warnings remain unsuppressed in the hash-bound V7 snapshot [L41].

The narrative is subordinate to those structured artifacts. If a sentence, table cell, or later export conflicts with a canonical summary or origin-level record, the validated structured record controls and the narrative must be corrected. Joshua Michael independently reviews each material claim, citation, inference, and numerical value as the accountable author.

V7 Modeled Result Record

Modeled route-coverage estimate [L41].

Field	5-mile near-base	20-mile primary
Result label	V7 modeled estimate	V7 modeled estimate
Publication status	Modeled estimate (5 caveats)	Modeled estimate (5 caveats)
V7 cohort	reachability-v7-audit-92bd2e6a45c3a7c6	reachability-v7-audit-92bd2e6a45c3a7c6
Pair ID	cia_headquarters-c5222d19d425d6c7	cia_headquarters-c5222d19d425d6c7
Pair seed	2841592109	2841592109
Generated at	2026-08-12T08:50:06.309362+00:00	2026-08-12T08:50:06.309362+00:00
Summary SHA-256	0818cd99514031a58454659c83786a434c90103b3a4a54bebd9fde577fef5d5f	1a5f8851150d91b088c6b99a2e39b9359f69c755c26e23163e8f1ee122055d2c
Routing engine	valhalla-3.6.3-auto-frozen-osm-camera-blind-directed-overlay-v6	valhalla-3.6.3-auto-frozen-osm-camera-blind-directed-overlay-v6
Synthetic draws	1000	2000
Headline channel	robust_lattice	robust_lattice
Primary H0 U/C/P/R counts	14/45/919/22	26/773/1141/60
Primary H0 U/C/P/R	1.4%/4.5%/91.9%/2.2%	1.2%/70.6%/24.5%/3.7%
Robust H0/H1/H2 U/C/P/R counts	13/43/808/136	20/684/1000/296
Robust H0/H1/H2 U/C/P/R	1.3%/4.3%/80.8%/13.6%	0.7%/62.1%/21.2%/15.9%
Direction H0 interval	1.4% to 95.5%	1.2% to 29.4%
Fixed-gate access interval	1.4% to 15.0%	0.8% to 17.0%
Joint interval	1.3% to 95.7%	0.7% to 37.9%
Spatial H0 interval	0.0% to 2.7%	1.2% to 3.0%
Gate reselection diagnostic	fixed 1.4%; reselected 1.3%; absolute difference 0.1 pp	fixed 1.1%; reselected 0.8%; absolute difference 0.3 pp
H0 gate near-tie sensitivity	60s: 0.8% disagreement weight; 120s: 15.3% disagreement weight; 300s: 29.0% disagreement weight	60s: 2.3% disagreement weight; 120s: 26.1% disagreement weight; 300s: 61.9% disagreement weight

Field	5-mile near-base	20-mile primary
H0 range sensitivity U/C/P/R	75ft: 54.4%/4.5%/38.9%/2.2%; 150ft: 1.4%/4.5%/91.9%/2.2%; 250ft: 1.4%/4.6%/91.8%/2.2%	75ft: 18.6%/70.2%/7.5%/3.7%; 150ft: 1.2%/70.6%/24.5%/3.7%; 250ft: 1.1%/70.9%/24.3%/3.7%
H0 direction sensitivity U/C/P/R	25deg: 55.5%/4.5%/37.8%/2.2%; 30deg: 2.6%/4.5%/90.7%/2.2%; 35deg: 1.4%/4.5%/91.9%/2.2%; 40deg: 1.4%/4.5%/91.9%/2.2%; 45deg: 1.4%/4.5%/91.9%/2.2%; 60deg: 1.2%/4.5%/92.1%/2.2%	25deg: 17.1%/70.6%/8.6%/3.7%; 30deg: 1.5%/70.6%/24.2%/3.7%; 35deg: 1.2%/70.6%/24.5%/3.7%; 40deg: 1.1%/70.6%/24.6%/3.7%; 45deg: 1.1%/70.6%/24.6%/3.7%; 60deg: 1.1%/70.6%/24.6%/3.7%
Deployment-status sensitivity U/C/P/R	declared_policy: 1.4%/4.5%/91.9%/2.2%; in_service_only: 55.8%/2.9%/39.1%/2.2%	declared_policy: 1.2%/70.6%/24.5%/3.7%; in_service_only: 50.8%/15.0%/30.5%/3.7%
Physical-camera-cluster influence	maximum removal shift 52.8 pp; 1 material cluster	maximum removal shift 22.9 pp; 2 material clusters
H0 validation	single-reviewer check	single-reviewer check
Modeling caveats	1. corridor routing is a single-reviewer accuracy check (~89.5%; see the report's Appendix O)2. primary H0 unresolved weight is 2.200%3. fixed-gate access-policy interval spans 13.600 pp4. direction-tolerance sensitivity exceeds materiality limit5. one or more physical camera clusters exceed the influence materiality limit	1. corridor routing is a single-reviewer accuracy check (~89.5%; see the report's Appendix O)2. primary H0 unresolved weight is 3.747%3. fixed-gate access-policy interval spans 16.211 pp4. direction-tolerance sensitivity exceeds materiality limit5. one or more physical camera clusters exceed the influence materiality limit
QA and artifact warnings	None	None

20-mile minus 5-mile weighted unobserved-rate difference: primary conditional H0 **-0.2** percentage points; separate robust H0/H1/H2 lattice **-0.6** percentage points. These channels answer different questions and are not averaged. [L41]

Reachability Results

Five-Mile Near-Base Scope

Publication state: Modeled estimate (5 caveats).

The 5-mile primary H0 channel contains 1,000 draws on the full in-frame sampled denominator: 14 unobserved (1.4%), 45 confirmed exposure (4.5%), 919 possible exposure (91.9%), 22 unresolved model (2.2%). The separate robust H0/H1/H2 lattice reports 13 unobserved (1.3%), 43 confirmed exposure (4.3%), 808 possible exposure (80.8%), 136 unresolved model (13.6%). Neither channel drops or renormalizes unresolved-model weight.

H0 uncertainty intervals: direction-H0 1.4% to 95.5%; fixed-H0-gate access 1.4% to 15.0%; joint 1.3% to 95.7%; spatial/grade-H0 0.0% to 2.7%. These are distinct sensitivity results and are not averaged.

Candidate-frame accounting: {"all_saved_gates_evaluated": true, "certificate_artifact_path": "frame_classification.json", "certificate_artifact_sha256": "37aa581d5ed60e783420a9149e03fbb8b1384eb539c8179fbf6204ccb20ba9a6", "classifier_contract": "h0-all-saved-gates-directed-per-leg-frame-v1", "classifier_version": 1, "closure": {"count_matches_source": true, "weight_matches_source": true}, "count_by_status": {"frame_unknown": 483, "near": 3302, "outer": 59112, "proven_out_of_frame": 41895}, "per_leg_scope_rule": "outbound_and_return_each_lte_declared_scope_radius", "source_count": 104792, "source_weight": 1849692.9999999986, "weight_by_status": {"frame_unknown": 5689.75, "near": 34697.33333333333, "outer": 1022037.2499999993, "proven_out_of_frame": 787268.6666666659}, "weight_semantics": "pre_sampling_occupied_housing_candidate_weight"}.

Sampled-frame accounting: {"count_by_status": {"artifact_error": 0, "frame_unknown": 0, "in_frame": 1000, "proven_out_of_frame": 0}, "rate_by_status": {"artifact_error": 0.0, "frame_unknown": 0.0, "in_frame": 100.0, "proven_out_of_frame": 0.0}, "source_count": 1000, "source_weight": 34697.33333333333, "weight_by_status": {"artifact_error": 0.0, "frame_unknown": 0.0, "in_frame": 34697.33333333333, "proven_out_of_frame": 0.0}}.

Modeling caveats: 1. corridor routing is a single-reviewer accuracy check (~89.5%; see the report's Appendix O)2. primary H0 unresolved weight is 2.200%3. fixed-gate access-policy interval spans 13.600 pp4. direction-tolerance sensitivity exceeds materiality limit5. one or more physical camera clusters exceed the influence materiality limit**QA and artifact warnings:** None [L41]

Twenty-Mile Primary Scope

Publication state: Modeled estimate (5 caveats).

The 20-mile primary H0 channel contains 2,000 draws on the full in-frame sampled denominator: 26 unobserved (1.2%), 773 confirmed exposure (70.6%), 1,141 possible exposure (24.5%), 60 unresolved model (3.7%). The separate robust H0/H1/H2 lattice reports 20 unobserved (0.7%), 684 confirmed exposure (62.1%), 1,000 possible exposure (21.2%), 296 unresolved model (15.9%). Neither channel drops or renormalizes unresolved-model weight.

H0 uncertainty intervals: direction-H0 1.2% to 29.4%; fixed-H0-gate access 0.8% to 17.0%; joint 0.7% to 37.9%; spatial/grade-H0 1.2% to 3.0%. These are distinct sensitivity results and are not averaged.

Candidate-frame accounting: {"all_saved_gates_evaluated": true, "certificate_artifact_path": "frame_classification.json", "certificate_artifact_sha256": "37aa581d5ed60e783420a9149e03fbb8b1384eb539c8179fbf6204ccb20ba9a6", "classifier_contract": "h0-all-saved-gates-directed-per-leg-frame-v1", "classifier_version": 1, "closure":

```

{"count_matches_source": true, "weight_matches_source": true}, "count_by_status":
{"frame_unknown": 483, "near": 3302, "outer": 59112, "proven_out_of_frame": 41895},
"per_leg_scope_rule": "outbound_and_return_each_lte_declared_scope_radius", "source_count":
104792, "source_weight": 1849692.99999999986, "weight_by_status": {"frame_unknown": 5689.75,
"near": 34697.333333333333, "outer": 1022037.2499999993, "proven_out_of_frame":
787268.66666666659}, "weight_semantics": "pre_sampling_occupied_housing_candidate_weight"}.
Sampled-frame accounting: {"count_by_status": {"artifact_error": 0, "frame_unknown": 0,
"in_frame": 2000, "proven_out_of_frame": 0}, "rate_by_status": {"artifact_error": 0.0,
"frame_unknown": 0.0, "in_frame": 100.0, "proven_out_of_frame": 0.0}, "source_count": 2000,
"source_weight": 1056734.5833333577, "weight_by_status": {"artifact_error": 0.0,
"frame_unknown": 0.0, "in_frame": 1056734.5833333577, "proven_out_of_frame": 0.0}}.

```

Modeling caveats: 1. corridor routing is a single-reviewer accuracy check (~89.5%; see the report's Appendix O) 2. primary H0 unresolved weight is 3.747% 3. fixed-gate access-policy interval spans 16.211 pp 4. direction-tolerance sensitivity exceeds materiality limit 5. one or more physical camera clusters exceed the influence materiality limit **QA and artifact warnings:** None [L41]

Relationship Between the Two Scopes

20-mile minus 5-mile weighted unobserved-rate difference: primary conditional H0 **-0.2** percentage points; separate robust H0/H1/H2 lattice **-0.6** percentage points. These channels answer different questions and are not averaged. Each directed outbound and return leg must independently satisfy its declared 5/20-road-mile scope; the total round trip may approach 10/40 miles. An origin with no unchanged saved gate qualifying under H0 is outside that scope before sampling [L41].

References

ID	Source and use in this report
E20	U.S. Supreme Court, <i>Carpenter v. United States</i> opinion, https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-402_h315.pdf - Digital location privacy policy/legal context.
E21	Library of Congress, <i>United States v. Jones</i> , 565 U.S. 400, https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep565400/ - GPS tracking/location surveillance policy/legal context.

ID	Source and use in this report
E37	Flock Group Inc., U.S. Patent No. 11,416,545 B1, “System and Method for Object-Based Query of Video Content Captured by a Dynamic Surveillance Network,” issued Aug. 16, 2022, https://patents.google.com/patent/US11416545B1/en - Flock’s own patent. Confirmed language: a “dynamic surveillance network” that is device-agnostic and ingests video from “unrelated surveillance devices” (neighborhood, residential, business, traffic, portable/mobile cameras); a “dynamic surveillance and object-based query” (DSOQ) server/system; object-based query of video “based on content of the video footage and not just time and location”; attribute profiling of people (“male, female, race,” height/weight/clothing) and vehicles (make/model/color/plate); and “face recognition data points”/facial-similarity feature-vector matching. Used only for the vendor’s own described architecture and intended capability; the report does not claim Flock has deployed any specific patented function, including facial recognition. Accessed 2026-07-13.
E44	U.S. Government Accountability Office, <i>Military Housing: DOD Should Address Critical Supply Shortages</i> (GAO-25-106208), product page, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-106208 - GAO summary states that about two-thirds of service members in the U.S. live off base in local communities. Used for national off-base housing share context for force-protection commute exposure. Not an installation-level census. Accessed 2026-07-16.
E45	Congressional Research Service, <i>Military Housing</i> (CRS Report R47728), https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47728 - CRS reports that about 58% of servicemembers receive a tax-free housing allowance (BAH) and obtain housing from the local housing market outside their installation. Complements E44 (slightly different metric: BAH recipients vs “live off base”). Used for off-base housing / civilian-market commute framing. Accessed 2026-07-16.
E46	DoD Travel Management Office / Defense Travel Management Office, Basic Allowance for Housing overview, https://www.travel.dod.mil/Allowances/Basic-allowance-for-Housing/ - Official BAH framing: compensation based on local civilian housing markets when government quarters are not provided; members choose off-base housing in the civilian market. Used only for policy mechanism (BAH → civilian infrastructure), not for a percentage. Accessed 2026-07-16.

ID	Source and use in this report
E49	U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Manual 4165.63, <i>DoD Housing Management</i>, incorporating Change 3, April 1, 2025, Enclosure 3, section 1.c.(2), https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodm/416563m.pdf - Official housing-market-analysis guidance: market-area boundaries may use a 20-mile or one-hour peak-traffic commute, with military/public information and installation-command recommendations supporting local adjustment. Used to justify a predeclared 20-road-mile primary reachability scope, not to claim that most personnel at a particular installation live within that distance. Accessed 2026-07-20.
E54	Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA Headquarters," https://www.cia.gov/legacy/headquarters - Official public history and location context for the Langley headquarters campus and its role as a workplace for thousands of CIA personnel. Used without inferring internal organization, schedules, or classified activity. Accessed 2026-07-21.
E55	Central Intelligence Agency, "About CIA," https://www.cia.gov/about/ - Official description of CIA's foreign-intelligence, all-source analysis, mission-center, technical, and digital responsibilities. Used only for publicly acknowledged mission context. Accessed 2026-07-21.
E141	Associated Press via PBS NewsHour, "Iran built a vast camera network to control dissent. Israel used it to track targets, AP sources say," March 23, 2026, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/iran-built-a-vast-camera-network-to-control-dissent-israel-used-it-to-track-targets-ap-sources-say - Reported precedent for state exploitation of street and traffic cameras to map senior officials, protective personnel, routes, parking locations, and meetings. Accessed 2026-08-08.
E147	The Guardian, "Snowden cache reveals diplomats' hotel bookings being tracked by GCHQ," November 17, 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/17/edward-snowden-diplomats-hotel-bookings-documents - Reported Royal Concierge precedent for monitoring diplomats' hotel reservations to identify travel timing and location and cue additional technical or human intelligence collection. Accessed 2026-08-08.

ID	Source and use in this report
L2	Supporting Tools and Docs/ supporting_memoranda/ FlockSafety_Four_Vulnerability_Chain.md ; Supporting Tools and Docs/ supporting_documents/finding_cards/ Finding_01_... - Finding_04_... ; source-evidence: Raw Evidence/Documentation/ My_Four_Vulnerabilities.md - Vulnerability timeline, Cure53-style finding cards, chain framing, remediation status.
L4	Supporting Tools and Docs/ supporting_documents/analyses/ FlockNova_Application_Capability_Enumeration. md - Nova search, access-control, and client-side enforcement-gap findings.
L5	Supporting Tools and Docs/ supporting_documents/analyses/ FlockSafety_Dev_Subdomain_Bundle_Enumeration. md - 370-host headline footprint, dev bundle families, and repeated-key evidence.
L8	Raw Evidence/FlockSafety/ flock_hardcoded_api_check.json - Primary validation artifact for key scope and 50 item grants.
L11	Supporting Tools and Docs/ supporting_documents/analyses/ ArcGIS_Search_App_Data.md - Search app data model, people-search device pool, plate/vehicle/search workflows.
L12	Supporting Tools and Docs/ supporting_documents/analyses/ ArcGIS_Hotlist_App_Data.md - Hotlist, alerts, hit history, and alerting data model.
L13	Supporting Tools and Docs/ supporting_documents/analyses/ ArcGIS_Mapped_Attributes.md - FlockOS/map layers and attributes; CAD/AVL, patrol/mobile, body-camera, drone, Raven/audio, and Flock911 surfaces; Flock911 incident-layer state, audio/transcript token classes, per- word start/end timing, selected-event state, and playback/ scrub controls.

ID	Source and use in this report
L14	Raw Evidence/ArcGIS/flocksafety_prod_arcgis_data/analysis_summary.json ; source dump: Raw Evidence/ArcGIS/flocksafety_prod_arcgis_data/features_*.json - 2025-12-14 ArcGIS export summary: 335,701 records, status/device-family counts from the package feature dump.
L15	Raw Evidence/ArcGIS/flocksafety_prod_arcgis_data/count_verification.json - Field verification: total/status breakdown; active=1 (214,233) vs status=inService (214,073) split; confirms scale claims use status , not active .
L20	Raw Evidence/Documentation/My_Four_Vulnerabilities.md ; P1 - Repository disclosure record and published article for my 53-exposure research, Finding 1 scope analysis, and public ArcGIS corroboration method.
L35	Raw Evidence/Screenshots/permissions_dronetoo.png ; Raw Evidence/FlockNova/nova_flockdemo_com/js/nova_flockdemo_com_App.js - Permission vocabulary including canCaravanSearch , Aerodome access, device tunnels, AVL sharing, nationwide lookup, and ArcGIS sign-in.
L37	Raw Evidence/FlockSafety/dev_app_flocksafety_com/dev-beefeater ; Raw Evidence/FlockSafety/dev_app_flocksafety_com/prod-beefeater - Burp XML wire records for Finding 3: anonymous GETs to Beefeater /api/v1/token/esri and /token/google returning HTTP 200 with tokens; no cookie/authorization.

ID	Source and use in this report
L40	Superseded earlier detailed run; the full per-origin paired study records are retained by the researcher offline for authorized review and are not shipped in this package. - The granular per-origin records (synthetic origins, gates, blocks, selected and attempted routes, blocked-camera observations, outcome records, seeds, and summary hashes) come from an earlier method run. They were removed from the shipped package because they were superseded by the V7 run and contain exact per-origin routes near the installations. The canonical V7 route-coverage estimates and their SHA-256 summary bindings are in L41 and control any transcription conflict.
L41	Complete V7 snapshot and staged cohort <code>reachability-v7-audit-92bd2e6a45c3a7c6</code> (index SHA-256 <code>3d0755cb6fcc7dd165c6b9dd53ade8bfe5402773231904ea3807d1f17dc3b96b</code>); primary conditional H0 and robust H0/H1/H2 results, methodology, frame accounting, split uncertainty, QA flags and warnings, hashes, and annexes. Canonical source: the hash-bound V7 snapshot at <code>../Supporting Tools and Docs/project_support/planning_and_qa/reachability_v7_audit_development_snapshot.js</code> on .

Per-site records

The V7 result for this installation - primary conditional H0 and robust H0/H1/H2 outcomes, frame accounting, uncertainty intervals, QA flags, seeds, and SHA-256 summary bindings - is recorded in the hash-bound V7 snapshot [L41]. The large per-origin staging artifacts (route geometry, frame classification, review packets) are not shipped in this package; the full records are retained by the researcher offline for authorized review [L40].